Interpreting Constitutional Texts

A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law
an essay by Antonin Scalia
with commentary by Amy Gutmann, editor, Gordon S. Wood, Laurence H. Tribe, Mary Ann Glendon, and Ronald Dworkin
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1998; 0691004006

I will consult the writings of some men who happen to be delegates to the Constitutional Convention--Hamilton's and Madison's writings in The Federalist, for example. I do so, however, not because they were Framers and therefore their intent is authoritative and must be the law; but rather because their writings, like those of other intelligent and informed people of the time, display how the text of the Consitution was originally understood. Thus I give equal weight to Jay's pieces in The Federalist, and to Jefferson's writings, even though neither of them was a Framer. What I look for in the Consitution is precisely what I look for in a statute: the original meaning of the text, not what the original draftsmen intended. (p. 38)